Monday, June 04, 2018

MasterPiece Cake Shop Vs. Govt. SJW Enforcers

No, that's not the actual name of the case decided by The SCOTUS today but it may have well been. This is probably going to be a long post so if you're short on time I suggest coming back later. That said, there are a few items in the decision that I want to bring attention to.

In 2012 a same-sex couple visited MasterpieceCakeshop, a bakery in Colorado, to make inquiries aboutordering a cake for their wedding reception. The shop’sowner told the couple that he would not create a cake for their wedding because of his religious opposition to same-sex marriages—marriages the State of Colorado itself did not recognize at that time.
In my opinion this statement of fact, that not even the state recognized homosexual marriages, should have been grounds for immediate dismissal of the complaint. Particularly since you cannot retroactively apply laws. For a state that did not recognize homosexual marriages to punish a citizen for essentially doing the same is the height of hypocrisy.
Phillips informed the couple that he does not “create”wedding cakes for same-sex weddings. Ibid. He ex-plained, “I’ll make your birthday cakes, shower cakes, sell you cookies and brownies, I just don’t make cakes for samesex weddings.” Ibid . The couple left the shop withoutfurther discussion. The following day, Craig’s mother, who had accompa-nied the couple to the cakeshop and been present for their interaction with Phillips, telephoned to ask Phillips why he had declined to serve her son. Phillips explained that he does not create wedding cakes for same-sex weddingsbecause of his religious opposition to same-sex marriage, and also because Colorado (at that time) did not recognizesame-sex marriages. Id. , at 153. He later explained hisbelief that “to create a wedding cake for an event thatcelebrates something that directly goes against the teach-ings of the Bible, would have been a personal endorsement and participation in the ceremony and relationship that they were entering into.” Ibid . (emphasis deleted).
I have made the argument that the shop owner did not decline service to the couple. The shop owner declined to perform a service that he does not perform. The owner was fully willing to provide service to the customers (birthday cakes, cookies...), he simply did not want to be involved in a homosexual wedding. That is his right. It is your right. None can force you to associate with an event. Most certainly not the government. I also pointed out that the objection was the association with the wedding and not the homosexuality of the potential customers. We know this because the mother called, whom we assume to be heterosexual. Had the store owner been against homosexuals period he could have sold her the cake. But he did not. It didn't matter what the "orientation" of the customer was. He wasn't going to associate with the event. More on that later.
The Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision in full. Id. , at 57a. The Commission ordered Phillips to “cease and desist from discriminating against . . . same-sex couples byrefusing to sell them wedding cakes or any product [they]would sell to heterosexual couples.” Ibid. It also ordered additional remedial measures, including “comprehensive staff training on the Public Accommodations section” of CADA “and changes to any and all company policies to comply with . . . this Order.” Id. , at 58a. The Commission additionally required Phillips to prepare “quarterly com-pliance reports” for a period of two years documenting “the number of patrons denied service” and why, along with “astatement describing the remedial actions taken.” Ibid.
What we had here was an attempt by the state to dictate to it's citizens what they must do. Not only that but they ordered what amounts to re-education camps. This is how the govt. has grown and how it is abused by those on the left.
Our society has come to the recognition that gay personsand gay couples cannot be treated as social outcasts or asinferior in dignity and worth. For that reason the laws and the Constitution can, and in some instances must, protect them in the exercise of their civil rights.
This is clearly Kennedy writing. How does he say that "society has..." when sitting on a case which clearly shows that what he said is not the case? In any case, we move to the meat of the decision and why the Court found for the baker:
The Civil Rights Commission’s treatment of his case has some elements of a clear and impermissible hostility toward thesincere religious beliefs that motivated his objection. That hostility surfaced at the Commission’s formal, public hearings, as shown by the record. On May 30, 2014, the seven-member Commission convened publicly toconsider Phillips’ case. At several points during its meet-ing, commissioners endorsed the view that religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried into the public sphere or commercial domain, implying that religious beliefs and persons are less than fully welcome in Colorado’s businesscommunity. One commissioner suggested that Phillipscan believe “what he wants to believe,” but cannot act on his religious beliefs “if he decides to do business in the state.” Tr. 23. A few moments later, the commissioner restated the same position: “[I]f a businessman wants to do business in the state and he’s got an issue with the— the law’s impacting his personal belief system, he needs to look at being able to compromise.” Id ., at 30....The commissioner stated: “I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the last meeting. Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimi-nation throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—we can list hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religionto hurt others.” Tr. 11–12...

The commissioner even went so far as to compare Phillips’ invocation of his sincerely held religious beliefs to defensesof slavery and the Holocaust. This sentiment is inappro-priate for a Commission charged with the solemn respon-sibility of fair and neutral enforcement of Colorado’s anti-discrimination law—a law that protects discrimination onthe basis of religion as well as sexual orientation.The record shows no objection to these comments fromother commissioners. And the later state-court rulingreviewing the Commission’s decision did not mentionthose comments, much less express concern with their content. Nor were the comments by the commissioners disavowed in the briefs filed in this Court.

Here's what did the state's case in. They openly derided the Christianity of the baker. Indeed, it appears that had the state commissioners not been on their SJW warpath and were professionals, they may have prevailed. People put under the state gun should be sure to note any and all arguments that are presented to them. This case shows that SJW type of talk that is regularly found on social media and even MSM can be used in court. This is a very good thing.

The downside of this decision is that it failed, spectacularly to support the idea that enumerated rights trump these so called "protected classes" and the privileges they are afforded. Clarence Thomas discusses this in his concurring opinion.

Court of Appeals concluded that Phillips’ conduct was not expressive and was not protected speech. It reasoned that an outside observer would think that Phillips was merely complying with Colorado’s public-accommodations law, not expressing a message, and that Phillips could post a disclaimer to that effect. This reasoning flouts bedrock principles of our free-speech jurisprudence and would justifyvirtually any law that compels individuals to speak. It should not pass without comment
Thank you Justice Thomas. Imagine the state telling you to post a sign to disclaim something the state forced you to do.
“[A]s a general matter,” public-accommodations laws do not “target speech” but instead prohibit “the act of discriminating against individuals in the provision of publicly available goods, privileges, and services.”Id., at 572 (emphasis added)
I recently had to point this out to the local "diversity" office which offered "training" in which certain speech and actions were "suggested". I pointed out that state agents may not compel speech. But understand that many lefty types who inhabit these offices seem to be unaware of their constitutional limits.
While this Court acknowledged that the unit’s exclusion might have been “misguided, or even hurtful,” ibid., it rejected the notion that governments can mandate “thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups or,indeed, all people” as the “antithesis” of free speech,id., at 579; accord, Dale,supra, at 660–661.
And..
Forcing Phillips tomake custom wedding cakes for same-sex marriages requires him to, at the very least, acknowledge that same-sex weddings are “weddings” and suggest that they should be celebrated—the precise message he believes his faithforbids. The First Amendment prohibits Colorado from requiring Phillips to “bear witness to [these] fact[s],” Hurley, 515 U. S., at 574, or to “affir[m] . . . a belief withwhich [he] disagrees,”id.,at 573.
I had to make this same exact point to the diversity officer. Their "training" "suggested" that employees "celebrate" whatever it is that the state was trying to push on us. It is not the state to tell citizens what they should or have to celebrate, particularly under threat of punishment.
Phillips routinely sacri-fices profits to ensure that Masterpiece operates in a waythat represents his Christian faith. He is not open on Sundays, he pays his employees a higher-than-average wage, and he loans them money in times of need. Phillipsalso refuses to bake cakes containing alcohol, cakes with racist or homophobic messages, cakes criticizing God, and cakes celebrating Halloween—even though Halloween isone of the most lucrative seasons for bakeries. These efforts to exercise control over the messages that Masterpiece sends are still more evidence that Phillips’ conduct isexpressive.
Same could be said of Chic-fil-A.
The Colorado Court of Appeals also erred by suggesting that Phillips could simply post a disclaimer, disassociating Masterpiece from any support for same-sex marriage. Again, this argument would justify any law compelling speech. And again, this Court has rejected it. We have described similar arguments as “beg[ging] the core question.”Tornillo,supra, at 256. Because the government cannot compel speech, it also cannot “require speakers toaffirm in one breath that which they deny in the next.” Pacific Gas & Elec., 475 U. S., at 16; see also id.,at 15, n. 11 (citing PruneYard, 447 U. S., at 99 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). States cannot put individuals to the choice of “be[ing] compelled to affirm someone else’s belief ” or “be[ing] forced to speak when [they] would prefer to remain silent.”Id., at 99>
That this needs to be said is sad. Now what follows should be noted by all:
States cannot punish protected speech because somegroup finds it offensive, hurtful, stigmatic, unreasonable, or undignified. “If there is a bedrock principle underlyingthe First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”Johnson,supra, at 414....If the only reason a public-accommodations law regulates speech is “to produce a society free of . . . biases” against the protected groups, that purpose is “decidedly fatal” to the law’s constitutionality, “for it amounts to nothing less than a proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression.”
Looking at any and all those laws like the one in NYC regarding calling a man a man regardless of whether he believes himself a woman. These laws are made for the strict purpose of making [enter group member here] to not feel bad. There is no constitutional right to not have your feelings hurt. Lefty types wish it were so and will act like it is so and enforce such wishes when they have power, but it is not lawful.

Now here comes Thomas's master stroke:

Concerns about “dignity” and “stigma” did not carry the day when this Court affirmed the right of white supremacists to burn a 25-foot cross,Virginia v. Black, 538 U. S. 343 (2003); conduct a rally on MartinLuther King Jr.’s birthday,Forsyth County v.Nationalist Movement, 505 U. S. 123 (1992); or circulate a film featuring hooded Klan members who were brandishing weapons and threatening to “‘Bury the niggers,’” Brandenburg v.Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 446, n. 1 (1969) ( per curiam ).Nor does the fact that this Court has now decided Ober- gefell v.Hodges, 576 U. S. ___ (2015), somehow diminish Phillips’ right to free speech. “It is one thing . . . to conclude that the Constitution protects a right to same-sexmarriage; it is something else to portray everyone who does not share [that view] as bigoted” and unentitled to express a different view.Id., at ___ (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting)
In other words, Thomas is asking why are homosexuals being afforded extra constitutional rights that were not extended to blacks who faced far greater problems. Of course lefty types will say that those decisions were wrongly decided and that the courts should have found against those who prevailed then. Why? Because "legal for me and not for thee". But really though this is about these fringe groups being given more and more power and normal people being afraid to be labelled racist, bigot or whatever.
In Obergefell, I warned that the Court’s decision would “inevitabl[y] . . . come into conflict” with religious liberty,“as individuals . . . are confronted with demands to participate in and endorse civil marriages between same-sexcouples.” 576 U. S., at ___ (dissenting opinion) (slip op., at 15). This case proves that the conflict has already emerged.
You and me both.